The aim of this research is to explore the relationship of corporate governance with firm risk. This study establishes a link between corporate governance variables and firm risk for a sample of 106 Pakistani firms over a time of six years (2005-2010). Based on the estimation results, family control and bank control have negative impact on the firm risk whereas ownership structure and chairman/CEO duality posit positive relationship with risk. This provides a direction for firms to introduce more non-family control to the board of directors and not allow banks to have majority shareholding in their stocks. Also, directors should be asked to have a reasonable ownership in the stocks of the firm so that they can decide in the best interest of the firm and for the increase of their stock value. Chief executive should also hold the chair in order to have unity of command and a better decision-making influence.
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Firm risk 1 has a role to play in firm performance 2 , because firms that take more risk generally have higher (although volatile) returns. Due to their volatile nature, firm-specific risks hinder the firm' s policy makers and planning department' s ability to forecast and plan their cash flows and related activities, etc. These risks are generally related to the returns on the firm' s stocks (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998) . However, firm-specific risks are also directly related to the performance of the firm (Nguyen, 2011) . Firms that engage in risky projects are expected to yield better returns that those which lack the appetite to take risks. However, excessive risk taking may prove to be fatal for a firm.
The relationship between corporate governance 1 Firm risk represents the firm's idiosyncratic (unpredictable) risk. It is a risk unique to a certain asset or company.
2
The results of activities of a firm over a given period of time. A majority of the corporate governance studies have focused on developed countries. Although there has been significant development in research on the developing economies also over the last few years, comparatively fewer studies 3 Agency theory predicts that the conflict between managers and shareholders reduces the performance of the firm; therefore, a liaison between managers' and shareholders' interest is necessary. This signifies the link between governance and firms' performance. 4 The example was based on the study of Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) who show that bank control hampers a firm's performance by limiting firm participation in risky ventures. developing countries (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002) . Therefore, the results of studies from developed markets might not be accurate in developing markets.
Furthermore, corporate governance research has mostly utilized Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and fixed/random effects estimation procedures.
However, these studies also use explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous, and use short time periods in their data panels.
Therefore, the published estimates may be biased (Wintoki, Linck, Netter, 2012) Bank control is positive when a bank has more than 50% shareholding in the firm. 7 Family control is considered positive when the founder or the founding family has influence over the firm policy and decision making. The ratio of shares held by board of directors and the total number of shares. 9 The ratio of shares owned by top five shareholders and the total number of shares. 10 The ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of members of the board of directors. 11 It is represented by the total number of members of the board. 12 A dummy having value as 1 if the chairman or the chief executive officer is the same person and 0 otherwise. 13 The ratio between non-executive directors in audit committee and the total number of directors in audit committee these eight variables, inter alia, was their relationship pointed out in prior literature on the topic; as one of our aims was to compare our results of system GMM modeling with prior research utilizing OLS estimation. Ease of data availability was also one of the factors that led us to consider these specific eight variables.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Better corporate governance leads to better operating performance (Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann, 2003) . Corporate governance has a major role to play in the performance of firms.
This role may be in relation to its decisionmaking metrics or its ability to indulge in risky projects to increase the chances of superior returns. Aman and Nguyen (2008) Since it is known that risk is directly related to returns, therefore, firm risk has a strong, although indirect, link to the performance of the firm. (2001) and with firm value in the studies of Morck et al. (2000) and Chen, Guo and Mande (2003) . 
Board Independence and Firm Risk
Structuring of a firm' s board of directors also plays a crucial role in reducing the agency costs (Hutchinson and Gul, 2003) . Therefore, the role of the executive board' s structure is also crucial for the firm' s value. Non-executive directors on the board of directors, acting on the part of external shareholders, are generally expected to monitor firm' s strategy and decision-making in this regard (Fama, 1980) . For a sample of 91
Pakistani firms, Khan and Awan (2012) 
Board Size and Firm Risk
Board size is also relevant to the firm performance as more the number of directors in the board are, better will be the decision-making, as no one person will be able to make decisions on his own. Belkhir (2009) This study is motivated of the negative relationship between an independent audit committee and firm risk. The three Fama and French factors are then calculated as:
R M represents the market return for month t. P t and P t -1 are closing values of KSE-100 Index for month t and t -1 respectively. R f is risk-free rate for which monthly T-bill rate has been used as proxy. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) 
After first differencing, equation (4) (Arellano and Bond, 1995) .
Thirdly, the effect of measurements errors on the dependent variables may worsen after firstdifferencing (Griliches and Hausman, 1986 16 With System GMM estimation, efficient estimates are obtained and dynamic endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity are also controlled. It is also assumed that there is no serial correlation in the error term ε.
was selected based on the ease of availability of data for the variables.
Summary statistics for the variables used in this study are reported in Table 2 below.
The sample of 106 firms was selected keeping the mind the following criteria as adopted by Nguyen (2011) Accounting for the firms with negative equity and/or instances of missing or incomplete data, the final sample was reduced to 106 firms. Table   3 presents the participation of each sector in the reduced and the selected sample for this study.  Growth opportunities are proxied by book to market ratio.
 Profitability is represented by return on assets (ROA) which is the ratio of operating profits to total assets.
 Capital intensity is represented by the ratio of fixed to total assets. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Correlation Analysis
Number of Significant Lags for Estimation
It is well-known that the appropriate number of lags of the dependent variable has to be incorporated in the dynamic models so that all the information from the past is captured. Failing to include all the significant lags will result in an omitted variable bias mis-specifying the equation (3). Also, all older lags can be used as valid instruments since they are argued to be exogenous with respect to the residuals of the present. For checking the significant lags required for our estimation, three 18 lags of the dependent 18 The estimation was also conducted for more than 3 lags but insignificant estimates were achieved for higher lags.
Category Variable Definition
Ownership
Family ownership A dummy having value 1 for a family firm (firms where the founder or the founding family has influence over the firm policy and decision making.) and 0 otherwise.
Bank ownership A dummy having value 1 for a firm having a bank as its majority shareholder (more than 50% shareholding) and 0 otherwise.
Managerial ownership
It is the ratio of shares held by board of directors and the total number of shares.
Block holders
It is the ratio of shares owned by top five shareholders and the total number of shares.
Board Characteristics Board independence
It is the ratio of non-executive directors (external board members) to the total number of members of the board of directors.
Board size
It is represented by the total number of members of the board.
Chairman/CEO duality A dummy having value as 1 if the chairman and the chief executive officer is the same person and 0 otherwise.
Audit committee independence
It is the ratio between non-executive directors in audit committee and the total number of directors in audit committee.
Table 4. Description of Governance Variables
variable are included in the regression of current firm risk on the lags of past firm risk. Control variables are also used in the regression. Table 6 presents the results of the estimation.
In the first column of the Table 6 , using all the 3 lags of risk, it can be observed that the first lag is highly significant with the second lag being insignificant. This ensures that the first lag is enough to capture the dynamic nature of the firm risk and corporate governance relationship. In the second column of Table 6 , the most recent (first lag) is dropped and the two older lags are used. Now, the older lags also become significant which indicates that although the older lags include related information, that information is absorbed by the most recent lag.
Dynamic Modeling of the Impact of Corporate Governance on Firm Risk
Using system GMM modeling allows estimating the relationship between corporate governance and firm risk by including the past performances and the fixed effects so that dynamic endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity can be controlled.
The results of Table 7  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** , ** , * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Notes:
 Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null that exogenous instruments are used for level equations.  AR(1) and AR(2) are 1 st and 2 nd order serial correlation (in the first differenced residuals) tests. The null hypothesis is no correlation.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** , ** , * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Based on the estimation results in 
CONCLUSION
The impact of corporate governance on firm performance and firm risk has been widely discussed, empirically and theoretically in prior studies; although the latter needs more research contrasting nature of the developed and developing markets.
IMPLICATIONS
The study has some significant implications for firms in order to enhance their performance.
Firms should aim at non-family directors on the board and should not allow banks to be their major shareholders since both negatively impact the firm' s risk-taking abilities and thereby hampering its performance. Firms should also encourage its directors to have more ownership in its stocks since that would induce them to make decisions catering for their incentives also. Also, a single person should hold both the chairman and chief executive officer since it provides a better decision-making power and the unity of command. Note: IR represents the idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) risk. BO and FO refer to bank ownership (a dummy variable having value 1 for a firm having a bank as its majority shareholder (more than 50% shareholding) and 0 otherwise) and family ownership (a dummy variable having value 1 for a family firm and 0 otherwise) respectively. MO and BH correspond to managerial ownership (the ratio of shares held by board of directors and the total number of shares) and block holders (the ratio of shares owned by top five shareholders and the total number of shares) respectively. BI refers to board independence which is the ratio of non-executive directors (external board members) to the total number of members of the board of directors. BS is the board size, represented by the total number of members of the board. DUALITY and ACI represent chairman/CEO duality (a dummy having value as 1 if the chairman and the chief executive officer is the same person and 0 otherwise) and audit committee independence (the ratio between non-executive directors in audit committee and the total number of directors in audit committee). FS, firm size is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets. FL represents firm leverage, which is the ratio of book equity to total assets. GO, growth opportunities are proxied by book to market ratio. FP, firm profitability is represented by return on assets (ROA) which is the ratio of operating profits to total assets. CI, capital intensity is represented by the ratio of fixed to total assets. ***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
LIMITATIONS
